Gambling with Other People’s Money: How Perverted Incentives Caused the Financial Crisis
A new paper by Russ Roberts available online. Below find the executive summary and an overview, courtesy of Tyler Cowen, of the main arguments.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, home prices in many American cities began a decade-long climb that proved to be an irresistible opportunity for investors. Along the way, a lot of people made a great deal of money. But by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, too many of these investments turned out to be much riskier than many people had thought. Homeowners lost their houses, financial institutions imploded, and the entire financial system was in turmoil.
How did this happen? Whose fault was it? Some blame capitalism for being inherently unstable. Some blame Wall Street for its greed, hubris, and stupidity. But greed, hubris, and stupidity are always with us. What changed in recent years that created such a destructive set of decisions that culminated in the collapse of the housing market and the financial system?
In this paper, I argue that public-policy decisions have perverted the incentives that naturally create stability in financial markets and the market for housing. Over the last three decades, government policy has coddled creditors, reducing the risk they face from financing bad investments. Not surprisingly, this encouraged risky investments financed by borrowed money. The increasing use of debt mixed with housing policy, monetary policy, and tax policy crippled the housing market and the financial sector. Wall Street is not blameless in this debacle. It lobbied for the policy decisions that created the mess.
In the United States we like to believe we are a capitalist society based on individual responsibility. But we are what we do. Not what we say we are. Not what we wish to be. But what we do. And what we do in the United States is make it easy to gamble with other people’s money—particularly borrowed money—by making sure that almost everybody who makes bad loans gets his money back anyway. The financial crisis of 2008 was a natural result of these perverse incentives. We must return to the natural incentives of profit and loss if we want to prevent future crises.
Read the full thing!
Tyler Cowen summarizes the arguments as follows:
- It isn’t “too big to fail” that’s the problem, it’s the rescue of creditors going back to 1984, encouraged imprudent lending and allowed large financial institutions to become highly leveraged.
- Shareholder losses do not reduce the problem even when shareholders are the executives making the decisions
- These incentives allowed execs to justify and fund enormous bonuses until they blew up their firms. Whether they planned on that or not doesn’t matter. The incentives remain as long as creditors get bailed out.
- Changes in regulations encouraged risk-taking by artificially encouraging the attractiveness of AAA-rated securities.
- Changes in US housing policy helped inflate the housing bubble, particularly the expansion of Fannie and Freddie into low downpayment loans.
- The increased demand for housing resulting from Fanne and Freddie’s expansion pushed up the price of housing and helped make subprime attractive to banks. But the ultimate driver of destruction was leverage. Either lenders were irrationally exuberant or were lulled into that exuberance by the persistent rescues of the previous three decades.